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This paper explores the dynamics of the transfer of U.S. patents and the significance of the initial missallocation
of patent property rights. Here we find that the initial missallocation of patent property rights is large
and differs substantially across patentees and technology fields. We also find that the probability of
a patent being traded depends on a number of factors - the age of the patent, the number of citations
received by a given age, the patent generality and whether the patent has been previously traded or
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An often discussed source of innovation for a national economy is the development of a mar-
ket for technology. A well developed market permits the diﬀusion of existing innovations
and allows ﬁrms to specialize in what they excel in. The beneﬁts of diﬀusion and special-
ization could be substantial, potentially oﬀsetting concerns about ineﬃciencies associated
with the patent system such as the grant of monopoly rights. Previous work has recognized
that an initial patent holder, a patentee, can ﬁnd it advantageous to license a patent to
another ﬁrm, maybe to a ﬁrm with a comparative advantage in the development and com-
mercialization process (Arora [8]; Gans and Stern [17]; Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella [9],
etc.). A lesser known fact is that ownership of a patent can be transferred and that when
there are potential gains from trade acquiring a patent rather than obtaining a license can
pose some beneﬁts.1 Namely, to the extent that patent ownership oﬀers a higher degree of
residual control rights than a license does, transferring an initially missallocated patent to
an alternative owner can reduce potential hold up problems especially when innovation is
cumulative and the investments of the alternative owner are speciﬁc (Grossman and Hart
[25]).2
The fact that a signiﬁcant proportion of patents are being transferred illustrates that
the beneﬁts of this market are considerable. This evidence also suggests that patent
property rights can be initially missallocated3 and that residual control rights play an
important role in the market for patents. Recognizing a role for residual control rights
in this market is important because economic policy choices like patent enforceability and
scope, which in eﬀect determine the residual control rights of a patent owner, should have
a direct impact on the functioning of this market. Furthermore, it is also likely that the
impact of patent policy will be larger for those patentees and technology ﬁelds where the
level of missallocation of property rights is signiﬁcant, as well as for inventions where there
are multiple cummulative uses and where the missallocation of property rights are likely
1The main diﬀerence between the licensing and the transfer of patents is that while the former constitutes
a permission of use or a promise by the licensor not to sue the licensee, the latter involves the transfer by
a party of its right, title, and interest in a patent.
2In a more general context, when innovation is cumulative it matters who owns the intellectual property
rights because the incentives for subsequent inventors might be aﬀected by the willingness to license or sell
the patents when innovating around them is diﬃcult (Merges and Nelson [40], Scotchmer [49], Gallini [19],
Green and Scotchmer [22]).
3Property rights are missallocated when an alternative owner with higher patent value than the the
current one and eﬃciency dictates that the patent should be reallocated to the alternative owner. For
instance, property rights can be initially missallocated when there exist opportunities for specialization and
innovators ﬁnd it advantageous to sell their patent; or because innovators unexpectively obtain inventions
that others have a higher value. The data, however, does not allow us to distinguish between these two
sources of missallocation.
1to be persistent over the life cycle of a patent. As a result, we expect that the design of
patent policy not only faciliates the reallocation of existing patent property rights, but also
potentially aﬀects the direction of technological change towards some technology ﬁelds and
patentees.
To assess these important economic implications, this paper analyzes how signiﬁcant
the missallocation of patent property rights are, whether there are any diﬀerences across
patentees and technology ﬁelds, and what patent characteristics might be systematic de-
terminants of the transfer and renewal of patents over their life cycle.
As we previously discussed, when a patent property right is missallocated, the patentee
can ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to reallocate the patent to another ﬁr m . W eh a v ef o u n dt h a tt h e
United States Patent Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO) registers these transactions, so called
assignments, in the Patent Assignments Database. We have obtained these records, con-
verted them to the patent level, and merged them to existing data on the renewal status of
patents as well as the number of patent citations received, technology ﬁeld (i.e., the patent
category), the generality of a patent, and the type of patentees (Hall, Jaﬀe, and Tratjenberg
[26]).4 The new data set contains all U.S. patents granted from 1983 to 2001 and describes
the history of transfers and renewal decisions. The assignment data is particularly useful
for empirical work because when a U.S. patent is sold the buyer might record the trans-
action at the USPTO. An assignment contains the patent numbers being transferred as
well as information concerning the rational of the transfer allowing us to identify changes
in the patents ownership.
By analyzing the changes in the patents ownership, we show that a large proportion of
patents are traded at least once over their life cycle, and that the citations weighted fraction
is even higher. If we look at reallocation patterns by patentees and technology ﬁelds, we
ﬁnd systematic evidence suggesting that the economic returns from patent trading and
the gains from specialization diﬀer across patentees and technology ﬁelds. In particular,
we ﬁnd that individual private inventors and small innovators are the most active sellers
and that computer and communications as well as the drug and medical industries are the
technology ﬁelds with the highest rates of transfer.5 This evidence will also help us learn
something about where patent trading and specialization in research is likely to be more
important.
4There exist a very extensive empirical body of work in economics using patent data. Schmookler [47],
Scherer [48], Griliches [24], Pakes and Schankerman [42] [46], Pakes [41], Tratjenberg [54], Harhoﬀ,N a r i n ,
Scherer and Vopel [27], etc.
5Small innovator patents are those that are issued to ﬁrms that were granted no more than 5 patents
in a given year. Similarly, large innovator patents are those issued to ﬁrms that were granted more than
100 patents in a given year.
2The panel structure of the new data allows us to observe a number of patterns about the
dynamics of the transfer and renewal of patents. First, we show that among patents of the
same age, the probability of being traded and the probability of being renewed increases
with the number of total citations received by a given age. Secondly, the probability
of being traded and the probability of being renewed increases with patent generality.
Third, previously traded patents, and especially the recently traded, are more likely to be
retraded and less likely to be allowed to expire than the previously untraded ones. Finally,
the probability of an active patent being traded decreases with age with one exception - in
the year immediately following each renewal date the probability discontinuously increases.
These patterns provide some information concerning whether the missallocation of property
r i g h t sa r el i k e l yt op e r s i s to v e rt h el i f ec y c l eo fap a t e n ta sw e l la ss o m eg u i d a n c ei nt h e
assessment of models of intellectual property transfer.
In addition, our work on the assignment data opens up new avenues of research such
as analyzing whether small ﬁrms specialize in the creation of innovations that are sold
eventually to their larger counterparts. The patterns of the transfer and renewal of patents
can be used to estimate the gains from trade in the market for patents (Serrano [50]). This
new data can also be useful in examining to what extent the move towards higher protection
of intellectual property rights that occurred in the mid 1980s facilitated specialization
and consequently trade in patents. Furthermore, matching the transfer data with the
characteristics of the buyers and sellers of patents permits both the estimation of returns
to R&D through the market for patents and explores whether patent property rights tend
to be transferred at the local geographical level as spillovers are. Finally, the data of
individual owners allows scholars to assess the eﬀects intellectual property taxation in
promoting innovation and reallocation of patents. Heretofore these questions have not
been previously addressed empirically due to a lack of data on how patents are traded.
To understand the empirical regularities in the data, we have used an extension of the
patent renewal model of Pakes and Schankerman [42] [46] developed by Serrano [50]. The
framework in Pakes and Schankerman relies on heterogeneity in the economic value of in-
ventions and a ﬁx e dc o s tt h a to w n e r sm u s tp a yt ok e e pap a t e n ta c t i v e . O u rm o d e la l l o w s
for the transfer of patents and adds two key features. First, it considers that some ﬁrms
garner greater beneﬁts than others in the use of a given patent, which in eﬀect implies
that there may exist potential gains from reallocating patents to other ﬁrms. For in-
stance, potential buyers might have complementary assets, prospective investments, better
production facilities or managerial skills. Second, it assumes that adopting a technology
developed by others involves a resource cost. This cost might represent a new organiza-
tional design by the acquiring ﬁrm, the hiring of new engineers, new R&D expenditures,
3etc. In summary, whereas Pakes and Schankerman’s model has one margin, i.e., whether
the patent owner should pay the fee for renewing the patent or not, our model has a sec-
ond margin which illustrates whether the cost of technology adoption should be covered to
reallocate the patent to an alternative owner.
The previous empirical work on markets for technology has mainly investigated either
strategic alliances or technology licensing by universities.6 The main disadvantage of using
data from strategic alliances is that the speciﬁc technology in the transactions cannot
be linked systematically to speciﬁc technologies or patent data and that most licensing
agreements are not publicly reported.7 The latter approach uses more detailed data on
the technology being transferred but the generality of the studies is limited to speciﬁc
universities, geographical areas, etc. As a result, the previous literature has been hampered
by a lack of systematic data on what type of technology is likely to be transferred, who are
t h em o s ta c t i v es e l l e r s ,w h a ta r et h em o s tt r a n s f e r - i n t e n s i v et e c h n o l o g yﬁelds, and what
characteristics are determinants of the transfer and licensing of patents.
Despite the rich information provided by patent assignments, there is very little work
using these records. To the best of our knowledge, Lamoreaux and Sokoloﬀ [34][35] and
this paper are the only ones that explore this concept to study markets for technology.
Lamoreaux and Sokoloﬀ use a sample of patents sales of private inventors and provide a
historical account of whether organized markets for technology existed in the late 19th and
early 20th century.8
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and describes some of
its predictions as it is useful to initially present an organizing framework for understanding
some of the empirical regularities that we will develop later. Section 3 explains the char-
acteristics of the new data, and section 4 documents the patterns. Section 5 concludes the
paper. Finally, the appendix covers the details of the construction of the data.
6Studies using data on strategic alliances are Arora [8]; Lerner and Merges [36]; Anand and Khanna [4];
Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella [9]; etc. Some studies using data on licensing by universities are: Agrawal
and Henderson [3], Branstetter and Ogura [13], Jaﬀe [29], Jaﬀe, Tratjenberg and Henderson [30], Jaﬀea n d
Tratjenberg [31], Sampat and Ziedonis [45].
7One notable exception in which strategic alliances are linked to patent number is Gans, Hsu, and Stern
[18]. They focus on a small sample of licensing agreements of biotechnology companies.
8Our paper also relates to the industrial organization literature on business transfers and exit, mergers,
and reallocation. In particular, Evans [16]; Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson [15]; Lichtenberg and Siegel
[37]; Pakes and Ericson [44]; Holmes and Schmitz [28]; Mitchell and Mulherin [39]; Andrade and Staﬀord
[5]; Graﬀ, Rausser and Small [21]; Maksimovic and Phillips [38]; Jovanovic and Rousseau [32].
42 A Model of patent transfers and renewals
This section presents a model detailing the transfer and renewal of patents.9 We will
consider the decision problem faced by an agent who holds a patent and we will also obtain
a number of predictions concerning both the probability of a patent being traded and its
expiring.
The problem for the agent is to decide whether to keep, sell, or let the patent expire.
Pakes and Schankerman [42] [46] examines the problem of a patent owner deciding in
each period of whether or not to pay a renewal fee in a context with heterogeneity in the
economic value of inventions. Building on their framework, we will consider that patents
may be traded because some ﬁrms can generate higher revenue than others using a given
patent, but transfering a patent and adopting the technology involves a ﬁxed cost to be
incurred by the buyer.10
Some potential buyers can generate higher patent revenue than a current patent owner
because they might have better production facilities and managerial skills as well as comple-
mentary assets. We consider that the best potential buyer of a patent with current revenue
x is characterized by an improvement factor ge ≥ 0 that generates revenue y = gex. We
also assume that the sharing rule of the gains from trade is eﬃcient and that the current
owner obtains all the surplus. This seller-takes-all the surplus will be useful for our analy-
sis, but allowing the buyer to capture some positive surplus as long as the sharing rule is
eﬃcient will not alter our qualitative results.
Let Va(x,ge) be the expected discounted value of patent protection to the agent just
prior to the ath renewal of a patent with revenue x if kept by current owner, and with an
improvement factor ge when sold to the potential buyer. If the renewal fee is not paid, then
t h ep a t e n te x p i r e sa n dVa(x,ge)=0 . I ft h er e n e w a lf e ei sp a i dt h eo w n e re a r n st h ec u r r e n t
revenue x and keeps the patent until the next renewal date. If the cost of technology
adoption and the renewal fee are paid, then the buyer earns patent revenue y and obtains
9The model in this paper is based on the theoretical model of the transfer and renewal of patents
developed by Serrano [50].
10The model does not consider a number of important issues such as strategic considerations, asymmetry
of information, the design and use of incentives in contracts of technology transfer, the demand for liquidity,
etc.. Katz and Shapiro [33], Gallini and Winter [20], and Shepard [51] consider the transfer of technology
as a strategic decision. Anton and Yao [6] [7] study markets where the inventors have an information
advantage with respect to the value of the technology and sellers are reluctant to disclosure the idea
because buyers may steal it without paying for it (Arrow [10]). Other scholars have analyzed the design
of licensing contracts in terms of incentives (Aghion and Tirole [2] and Arora [8]; and recently Silveira and
Wright [52] develop a model of the interplay between the demand for liquidity and the market for ideas.
5the ownership of the patent.
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Where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, τ is the cost of adopting a technology11 and Ege[.]
is the expectation operatoro v e rt h er a n d o mv a r i a b l ege with cdf Fge. Finally, the initial
patent revenue is distributed with cdf Fx1 and patent revenue depreciates deterministically
between periods at a ﬁxed rate δ ∈ (0,1) as in Pakes and Schankerman. The deterministic
rate implies that when the patent is kept, x0 = δx, a n dw h e ni ti ss o l d ,x0 = δy.
To illustrate the economic forces at play in the decision of a patent owner, consider a
patent of age a with revenue x at the beginning of a period and with a potential buyer
characterized by an improvement factor ge. The patent will be sold when the improvement
factor is large enough so that the ﬁxed costs of adopting the technology can be amortized
over time. If we look at an older patent with the same current revenue, it will be less
likely to be sold because when the patent horizon is shorter, a higher improvement factor is
needed to amortize the costs of adoption. Furthermore, if we ﬁx the age of the patent, we
ﬁnd that the higher the patent revenue x is, the lower the improvement factor needed to
amortize the cost of adoption. A lower improvement factor is needed because the diﬀerence
between the value of keeping and selling the patent, i.e., V S
a (x,ge) − V K
a (x,ge), increases
with x as does the diﬀerence between the revenue of the potential buyer and the current
owner, y − x. These are the main trade oﬀs in the decision problem of a patent owner.
More formally, Serrano [50] shows that there exist functions b ge
a(x,τ) and b xa(τ) that
divide the policy space into three areas (keep, sell or let the patent expire) as illustrated in
Figure 1. The cutoﬀ b ge
a(x,τ) is the improvement factor that makes a patent owner indif-
ferent between selling or not selling a patent with revenue x and age a.I f t h e i m p r o v e m e n t
factor is above the cutoﬀ, then the patent will be sold. For suﬃciently low improvement
11There is little evidence on estimates of costs of technology transfer. ˘ Astebro [11] studies the adoption
of both CAD and CNC technologies and ﬁnds that there are large ﬁxed noncapital and capital costs of
adoption.















factor, the revenue b xa makes the owner indiﬀerent between keeping the patent or letting it
expire (as in Pakes and Schankerman). In this case, patents with lower revenues than b xa
are left to expire.
The model has two theoretical results, namely the selection and horizon eﬀect, as well
as a number of testable implications.12 Serrano proves that for a ﬁxed age, the function
b ge
a(x,τ) is decreasing with x, implying that the probability of a patent being traded is
increasing with x. That is, the higher the revenue x is, the lower the improvement ge
needed for the owner of the patent to be indiﬀerent between selling it or not. We call
this the selection eﬀect because traded patents, and especially recently traded, have higher
revenue on average prior to a potential trading date than the previously untraded ones.
This selection eﬀect will show why previously traded patents are more likely to be traded
and less likely to be allowed to expire than the previously untraded ones as presented in
Section 4. The second result illustrates that for a ﬁxed patent revenue x, the function
b ge
a(x,τ) is increasing with a which implies that the probability of an active patent being
traded decreases with age for a ﬁxed revenue x. That is, as a patent with a ﬁxed revenue x
gets older, the owners must meet better potential buyers in order to be indiﬀerent between
12There are several key elements that allows Serrano to prove the results. One is that the cost of
adopting a technology is ﬁxed and does not fully internalize how the diﬀerence between the value of selling
or not selling a patent changes as the revenue and age of the patent varies, i.e., the ﬁxed cost of adoption
of technology is not proportional to the diﬀerence between the value of not selling and selling the patent
(net of the cost). Another important element of the structure of the model is that the improvement factor
ge is independent of the age and revenue of the patent. This simpliﬁes the process ge and implies that
the buyer’s per period patent revenue depends on the revenue of the current owner. If the revenue of the
potential buyer was independent of the revenue of the current owner, then neither the selection nor the
horizon eﬀect would generally hold.
7selling the patent or not. We call this the horizon eﬀect because a shorter horizon implies
less time to amortize the cost of adopting a technology. The horizon eﬀect will show why
the probability of an active patent being traded decreases with age with the exception of
the renewal dates as presented in Section 4.
The fact that mandatory renewal fees in the US patent system are not due annually
creates some interesting testable implications. Our model predicts that two opposing forces
determine the probability of a patent being traded the year following immediately after a
renewal date.13 On the one hand, the probability of an active patent being traded may
increase after a renewal date because the average revenue of the renewed patents is higher
than the average revenue of the existing patents immediately prior to the renewal date.
Consequently, the sample selection generated by the renewal decision and the result that
patents with higher revenue are more likely to be traded (we will call this the renewal sample
selection eﬀect) implies a discrete jump of the probability of an active patent being traded
following immediately after a renewal date.14 On the other hand, this probability might
decrease as the revenue of patents depreciate and their ages increase over the year following
immediately after a renewal date. This is because when the revenue decreases with age the
selection eﬀect implies that the probability of a patent being traded decreases, and when
ap a t e n ti so l d e rt h eh o r i z o ne ﬀect implies that the probability of a patent being traded
decreases as well. Therefore, we should observe a discontinuous jump in the empirical
probability of an active patent being traded the year following immediately a renewal date
only when the renewal sample selection is the dominant eﬀect.
We can summarize the prections of the model:
Prediction 1: For a ﬁxed revenue x, the probability of an active patent being traded de-
creases with age.
Prediction 2: For ﬁxed age a, the probability of an active patent being traded increases
with its revenue.
Prediction 3: Previously traded patents are more likely to be retraded than the previously
untraded ones.
Prediction 4: Previously traded patents are less likely to be allowed to expire than the
previously untraded ones.
13In the U.S. patent system mandatory renewal patent fees are due at the end of the 4th, 8th and 12th
year. If the fees are not paid, then the patent expires.
14This is because the distribution of per period revenue immediately after a renewal decision stochastically
dominates the distribution of revenue prior to a renewal date.
8Prediction 5: Recently traded patents are more likely to be traded and less likely to be
allowed to expire than the less recently traded ones.
Prediction 6: The probability of an active patent being traded increases immediately after
a renewal date.
Remark: This paper models the transfer of the ownership of patents but does not
explicity consider the licensing of patents. However, the licensing of patents is certainly
a real phenomenon and the model accommodates this possibility.15 To account for this,
we can think of patent revenue representing both the proceeds of adopting and using a
technology as well as the ones that the buyer could additionally obtain by licensing the
patent to others. Furthermore, the economic process we have considered here assumes that
buyers of patents are adopters and users of the acquired technology rather than ﬁrms spe-
cializing on managing patents.16 For instance, a ﬁrm could exclusively focus on managing
a patent by licensing it to many others who can then adopt it, but ﬁrms exclusively man-
aging patents is a rather new organizational form mainly associated with ﬁrms acquiring
patents for prospective litigation purposes.
3 Measuring transfer of technology with the USPTO
assignment data
There are several aspects that makes the assignment data particularly interesting for em-
pirical work. In contrast to strategic alliance and licenses transactions, the transfer of the
ownership of patents is recorded because of the legal requirement that all assignments have
to be ﬁlled with the USPTO in order to be legally binding. Furthermore, assignments
contain information concerning the rational of the transfer as well as the patent numbers
being transferred which provide very detailed information on the technology that they rep-
resent. These aspects allow us to explore what type of patentees and in what industries
patent trading is likely to be more important, the patent life cycle eﬀects in the transfer of
patents and the importance and the generality of the patent being transferred.
The rest of this section is divided into four parts. First, the contents of the assignment
data we use to create the new data set of the transfer of patents. Second, the general
15There is no systematic data on patent licensing revenue, but there exist some anecdotal evidence.
IBM’s licensing revenue was $1.6 billion in year 2000 (Berman [12]) as reported in Merrill, Levin and
Myers [53]. In 1996 U.S. corporations received $66 billion in income from royalties of unaﬃliated entities
(Degnan [14]). Texas instruments reported to have obtained $1.6 billion in licensing royalties from 1996
to 2003 (Grindley and Teece [23]).
16We would like to thank a referee for pointing this issue to us.
9principles that led to the decision made in the construction of the data. Third, the
description of the data sample. Fourth, the contents of the new data set.
Original assignment data The main source of our data is the USPTO Patent As-
signment Database. When a U.S. patent or a bundle of patents are transferred, an as-
signment may be recorded at the USPTO acknowledging the transfer by a party of the
rights, title and interest in a patent or bundle of patents. The USPTO maintains all as-
signments recorded. A typical assignment is characterized by a unique identiﬁer (i.e., reel
frame), the name of the buyer (i.e., assignee) and the seller (i.e., assignor), the date that
the assignment was recorded at the patent oﬃce (i.e., recorded date), the date the private
agreement between the parties was signed (i.e., execute or signed date), the number of
patents or patent applications included in the assignments, and the type of the assignment
acknowledging the rational of the transfer (i.e., brief).17 We have obtained these records
in electronic format in a daily basis from August 1, 1980 to December 31, 2001.
The most recorded type of assignment in the data base represents the transfer of owner-
ship from one entity to another (i.e., assignment of assignors). An assignment of assignors
that is a ﬁr s ta s s i g n m e n tt e n d st ot a k ep l a c ew i t h i nt h eﬁrm at which the original inventor
of the patent works.18 Instead, assignment of assignors that are subsequent assignments
(i.e., reassignments) represent the transfer of the ownership of patents across ﬁrm bound-
aries. While assignment of assignors is the most common transaction, assignments can
also be recorded to acknowledge the union of two or more commercial interests (i.e., merg-
ers); when a patent is used as a collateral (i.e., security interest); a change of name of the
ﬁrm that owns the patent or patent application (i.e., change of name); as a correction of a
previous record (i.e., pro nunc tunc), etc.
Data construction. Here we will describe the three main principles that led to the
decisions made in the construction of the data set. The details of the procedures we
use to deal with the assignment data are explained in the appendix of this paper. First,
our main interest in the new data ultimately lies in the reallocation of the ownership of
patents for technological purposes. The assignment data allows us to identify and separate
assignments recorded as administrative events such as a name change, a security interest,
a correction, etc.
17Unfortunately, the names of the buyer and seller in the Patent Assignment Data Base were never
standarized by the USPTO.
18The U.S. patent law mandates that patents rights ﬁrst belong to their inventor unless assigned to
others. For this reason, it is common in labor contracts to specify that employees must assign the rights
of their inventions to the ﬁrm or organization in which they work.
10Second, we focus on transaction of patents across ﬁrm boundaries. We identify whether
the recording of a transaction is a ﬁrst assignment or a reassignment using the name of the
patent inventors and the assignee as of the grant date of the patent. When assignees as of
the grant date of the patent are ﬁrms or government agencies, we exclude ﬁrst assignments.
On the other hand, if patents are individually owned as of the grant date, then we consider
the assignment a patent transfer. For future reference, we deﬁne “trades” or “transfers”
as reallocations of patents across ﬁrm boundaries.
Finally, we link the assignment records at the patent level to existing patent data on
patent renewals, citations, generality, technology ﬁeld, the name of the assignee as of the
grant date of the patent, and other patent characteristics. The information on patent
technology ﬁeld, citations, generality and the name of the assignee as of the grant date
of the patent can be obtained from the NBER Patent Database for patents granted from
January 1, 1975 to December 31, 2002 . The renewal information is based on information
from the USPTO Oﬃc i a lG a z e t t ea sc o l l e c t e di nt h eU S P T OP a t e n tB I BD a t aB a s ea so f
December 31, 2002. The data contains the renewal status of patents subject to renewal
fees.19
Sample selection. The selection is based on a number of patents and patentee char-
acteristics as of the grant date of the patent. First, we focus on patents that are subject to
renewal fees and that were granted since January 1, 1983. U.S. patents subject to renewal
fees are those applied for after December 12, 1980.20 Furthermore, since on average the
application period is about 2.5 years, we use patents granted since January 1, 1983 to create
a comprehensive data set.
Second, we consider utility patents and exclude patent applications. Utility patents
represent the most common type of patent. Patent applications are not included because
we have no information about applications that were not granted.
Third, the time unit of analysis of the new data set is the age of a patent counted in
years. In principle, an active patent can be traded at any date. In our empirical analysis,
19As of today, the Patent BIB Database is the best publicly available source in electronic format for
information on patent expiration. However, we have found that there could be some inconsistencies dealing
with patents that were initially expired and then reinstated due to late payment of mantenaince fees. This
is certainly a very small number of patents and should not aﬀect the results in the paper.
20In the U.S. patent system, the maximum possible term of an issued patent (assuming that any required
renewal fees are paid) was 17 years until June 8, 1995. Since then, for patents applied prior to June 8,
1995, the term of a patent is either 20 years from the earliest claimed ﬁling date or 17 years from the issue
date, whichever is longer. For patents applied for after or on June 8, 1995, the maximum lenght is 20
years from the application date. In the U.S. patent system, patents applied for from December 12, 1980
are subject to renewal fees by the end of years 4, 8 and 12 since its grant date. If renewal fees are not
paid, then the patents expire.
11however, we consider that a patent is traded in a given year if it was traded at least once
over that period.21
Finally, when studying patent transfers, one must recognize that patents that are traded
in large blocks might not represent technology transfers, for example, a merger between two
large companies.22 Obviously, in a wholesale trade of thousands of patents, the decision
making is not uniquely at the level of a single patent or necessarily driven by the reallocation
of technology.23 For this reason and to parallel our theoretical analysis at the patent level,
it will be useful to look at patents from diﬀerent patentees, and especially those from
small innovators (i.e., patents granted to ﬁrms with no more than ﬁve patents granted in
ag i v e ny e a r )a n dindividually owned patents (i.e., patents granted to individual inventors
and unassigned patents as of their grant date).24 I nd o i n gs o ,t h ee c o n o m i cf o r c e st h a tw e
highlight will be more salient than in the transactions involving two very large corporations
or patents owned by large corporations.25
Contents of the transfer data. The new data set is a panel of patents whose history
of trades and renewal decisions took place up to the end of the year 2001.26 Patents are
categorized by their quality or importance, generality, the patentees, and when the patentee
is a corporation we can add a measure of the size of the ﬁrm as of the grant date of the
patent. Summary statistics about granted and traded patents by type of patentee can be
found in Table 5 in the appendix.
Every measure of patent quality or importance we can potentially use is going to be
imperfect. We follow the previous literature and use citations received as such a measure.
We consider that citations are correlated with the private value to patent protection, but
they do not cause it. In practical terms, we use two terminologies that are associated to
21For instance, if a patent was traded during its second year of life (e.g. 17 or 22 months since being
issued), we consider that the patent was traded at age 2.
22For instance, when Burroughs Corporation merged with Sperry Corporation to create Unisys Corpo-
ration in September 1986, this event appears in the data as transactions totaling 2261 patents (the largest
single transaction includes 1702 patents).
23For instace, these transactions can be recorded as a result of large acquisitions pursued to increase the
buyer’s market share in a particular product or ﬁeld, etc.
24Studying small innovators and individually owned patents is interesting in their own right, given the
importance they play in the innovation process (Acs and Audretsch [1]; Arrow [10]).
25For instance, we ﬁnd that the proportion of patents traded in bundles of more than 100 patents, which
were mostly developed by large ﬁrms, disproportionately increase in the periods of merger such as the mid-
1980s wave and late 1990s. In addition, according to Mitchell and Mulherin [39], a substantial number of
acquisitions in the wave of mid 1980’s could be explained by major shocks such as deregulation, increased
foreign competition, ﬁnancial innovations, etc. We see these forces inherently diﬀerent than those that
predict the transfer of knowledge due to specialization, which is what we mean by economic forces.
26There are 20 cohorts coexisting in the unbalanced panel. For the case of non-censored cohorts (i.e.,
granted from 1983 to 1985).
12the number of patent citations received. We deﬁne total citations received by a given age
as the sum of citations received from the grant year of the patent to the year it is up for
trade or renewal. We deﬁne total citations received by the maximum legal length of patent
protection as the sum of citations received from the grant date and until the maximum
legal length of patent protection.27
T h eg e n e r a l i t yv a r i a b l ea n dp a t e n tc a t e g o r ya r ed e ﬁn e da si nH a l l ,J a ﬀea n dT r a t j e n b e r g
[26]. Generality measures whether the impact of a patent is broad. That is, conditional
on the total number of citations ever received, if a patent is cited by others belonging to
a wide range of ﬁelds, then the generality variable will be high, while if most citations
are concentrated in a few ﬁelds, then it will be low. This measure is interesting because
it reﬂects the range of opportunities of applications perhaps from potential buyers. The
patent category variable assigns patents into six diﬀerent technology ﬁelds: chemicals;
computer and communications; drugs and medical; electrical and electricity; mechanical;
and other.28
Finally, we consider six type of patentees or owners of patents as of their grant date.
T h et y p eo fp a t e n t e e sa r ei n d i v i d u a lp r i v a t ei n v e n t o rp a t e n t s ,u n a s s i g n e dp a t e n t sa so ft h e
grant date owned by the inventors; small, medium and large innovators; and government
agencies.29 When the owners are corporations or innovators, we can construct a measure
o ft h e i rs i z eb a s e do nt h et o t a ln u m b e ro fp a t e n t sg r a n t e di nag i v e ny e a r . T h i sa l l o w su s
to match all the patents to patentees. While we would like to use standard measures of
ﬁrm size like employees or assets, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd such measures for all the patentees.
The new data makes a contribution adding a dynamic component, namely the transfer of
patents, to the existing data work on patents. The data, however, is not without drawbacks.
First, after a patent has been granted, the names of the ﬁrst buyer, and subsequent sellers
and buyers of the transactions are not standardized by the USPTO. Second, we cannot
distinguish the acquisition of a ﬁrm from the acquisition of a bundle of patents.30 Third,
we do not have information on the price paid for the patents transferred. Fourth, the data
27When the last year that a patent is observed in the panel is less than the maximum legal length, then
we use the number of total citations received as of the last year the patent is observed. (i.e., a patent
granted in 1990 will use the number of total citations received up to age 11).
28We thank a referee for suggesting us to consider the variable generality.
29Small innovators patents are deﬁned as those owned by corporations that were granted no more than
5 patents in a given year. Large innovators patents are those issued to corporations with more than 100
patents granted in a given year. Medium innovators patents are the rest.
30In the hypothetical case that a small innovator was acquired rather than a bundle of its patents, we
consider that it might be acquired mainly because of the value of its technological assets. In this scenario,
the transfer will likely involve a cost of adopting and especially setting up the technology in the new ﬁrm.
Thus, to some extent an acquisition of an innovative ﬁrm would be no necessarily diﬀerent than the transfer
of its patents.
13does not allow us to distinguish between patent being acquired by ﬁrms who adopt the
technology and ﬁrms who might specialize in managing patents by licensing them to many
others who can then adopt it. Firms exclusively managing patents, however, is a rather
new organizational form mainly associated with ﬁrms acquiring patents for prospective
litigation purposes. For this reason we expect that the majority of the transfers in our data
set represent the adoption of a technology. Fifth, we have assignment data in electronic
format from August 1, 1980 to December 2001.
4 Patterns of the transfer and renewal of patents
In this section we present two sets of patterns underlying the transfer and renewal rates by
type of patentees, technology ﬁeld, patent characteristics and a patents life cycle. The ﬁrst
set of patterns show the level of missallocation of patent property rights across patentees
and technology ﬁelds. These patterns present a introductory picture of the market for
patents rather than a test of the theory previously developed in Section 2.
The second set of patterns identify a number of patent characteristics that are deter-
minants of the trading and renewal decision such as the age and importance of a patent.
These patterns are the empirical counterparts of the testable implications of the theory
previously presented.
Furthermore, the robustness of the patterns is analyzed using a logit model.31 The
parametric analysis is useful because it allows us to control on a larger number of variables.
There are two groups of regressions we present in the appendix. The ﬁrst group considers
all active patents and uses controls on age, patent category (i.e., technology ﬁeld), patentee
a n dc i t a t i o n s . I ti sa l s ou s e f u lt or u nas e c o n dg r o u pw i t he a c ho ft h ep a t e n t e e si na
separate regression.
4.1 The transfer and renewal of patents across patentees and
technology ﬁelds
The ﬁrst set of patterns present both the proportion of patents that are traded at least
once over their life cycle and the proportion of patents that are allowed to expire by the
last renewal fee across patentees and technology ﬁelds. These rates will allow us to learn
something about where patent trading is likely to be more important and about the level
31Similar results should be obtained analyzing the data with alternative parametric model.
14of missallocation of patent property rights.32
Pattern #1: The proportion of patents traded varies across patentees, and this proportion
is higher when weighted by the total number of citations received by the legal maximum
length of patent protection.
Table 1A provides the disaggregated cumulative transfer rates during the life cycle of
patents across patentees. These rates vary from a low 4.1% to a high of 17.5%. The
average rate of transfer is 13.5%. The columns in the table correspond to each of the
patentees. Small innovators and private inventors are the patentees that are more likely to
sell their patents; followed by medium innovators, individually owned unassigned patents
as of the grant date, large innovators and governments agencies. Among corporations,
the rates of transfer decrease with the size of the ﬁrms. Furthermore, when weighted
by the total number of citations received by the legal maximum length of a patent, the
cummulative rates of transfer are higher.33 The weighted rates vary from 6% to 24.1%.
Pattern #2: The proportion of patents that are let to expire varies across patentees. The
proportion is lower when weighted by the total number of citations received by the legal
maximum length of patent protection.
Table 1B presents the cumulative expiration rates of patents by the last renewal fee
at age 13. These rates vary substantially from 50% to 83.5%, with an average of 59.5%.
When weighted by total number of citations received by the maximum legal length of
patent protection, the rates are lower and the variation increases from a low 39.9% to a
high 74.4%. The table also shows that corporations are less likely to let their patents
expire than individual owners and government agencies. And within corporations, small
innovators are the ones most likely to let their patents expire while large innovators are the
least.
The robustness of the eﬀects of pattern #1 and #2 are studied by the inclusion of
dummy variables in a logit model. We consider dummies for the type of patentees, tech-
nology ﬁelds (i.e., patent categories) and patent age. With this parametric model we can
also control on the total number of patent citations received by a given age. Table 6, in the
appendix, presents both the predicted probabilities of a patent being traded and expired by
32I will be omitting the standard errors of the proportions because they are small as the number of
observations is rather large.
33Similar results are obtained when the weighs are based on the total citations received by a given year,
i.e., the year that a patent is up for trade or renewal.
15Table 1: Proportion of Patents Traded and Expired by Type of Patentees
Individual owners Corporations (Innovators) Govt. Agencies
All Unassigned Priv. Inventors All Small Medium Large
A. Proportion of patents traded over their life cycle by type of patentees
Unweighed 12.4 12.2 16.2 14.0 17.5 14.6 10.5 4.1
Weighed by
citations 19.0 18.7 24.1 17.2 24.0 17.4 11.4 6.0
B. Proportion of patents expired up to the last renewal fee by type of patentees
Unweighed 77.5 77.7 73.1 55.1 60.3 55.5 50.0 83.5
Weighed by
citations 68.4 68.9 62.0 43.2 48.8 42.8 39.1 74.4
Note: the proportions of this table are created using a pooling of all U.S. patents granted from 1983 to 2001.
type of patentees constructed with the estimates of the logit model. The probabilities are
evaluated at the mean of the sample of the technology ﬁelds and citations. The predicted
cummulative rates of transfer vary from a low 4.1% to a high of 18.6%.
Pattern #3: The proportion of patents traded varies across technology ﬁelds (i.e., patent
categories).
Table 2A presents the cummulative transfer rates across technology ﬁelds. The six
columns represent the aggregate technology ﬁelds in which patents are classiﬁed. The
rates vary from a low 12% to a high of 16%. The patents most likely to be traded are
those belonging to the categories of computer and communications, drugs and medical, and
electricity and electronics.
Pattern #4: The proportion of patents allowed to expire varies across technology ﬁelds
(i.e., patent categories).
Table 2B presents the rates of expiration across technology ﬁelds by the last renewal
date at age 13. The columns of the table correspond to the technology ﬁelds. The
proportion of patents allowed to expire diﬀers across patent categories from a low 47.3%
to a high of 67.9%.
While the diﬀerences in the rate of transfer and expiration across technology ﬁelds and
patentees are signiﬁcant, they could also depend on the patterns of patenting by patentees
and the characteristics of their patents. To account for this possibility, we run logit models
for both the trading and the expiring decision regressed on a number patent characteristics
as controls. Like in the previous section, we use the total number of citations received and
16Table 2: Proportion of Patents Traded and Expired by Patent Category
Computer Drugs & Elec. &
Chemical & Comm Medical Electro. Mechanical Other
A. Proportion of patents traded over their life cycle by patent categories
14.9 12.9 16.0 13.8 12.0 13.1
B. Proportion of patents expired up to the last renewal fee by patent categories
60.0 47.3 57.4 55.1 61.7 67.9
Note: the proportions of this table are created using a pooling of all U.S. patents granted from 1983 to 2001
and their trading and renewal decisions.
dummies for the type of patentees, technology ﬁelds, and patent age. Table 7 presents
the predicted cummulative probabilities of transfer and expiration by technology ﬁelds and
patentees evaluated at the sample mean of the controls. The diﬀerences are now somewhat
smaller, but the rates are similar.
It is also useful to take a more detailed look at the rates of transfer and expiration. Table
3 reports these rates across patentees and disaggregated by technology ﬁelds. The top part
of the table presents the cumulative transfer rates and the bottom part the cumulative rates
of expiration by age 13. The columns of the table are the technology ﬁelds and the rows
are the type of patentees. The magnitude of the diﬀerences in the transfer rates between
patentees vary when we examine technology ﬁelds separately, maybe indicating a diﬀerent
degree of patentee specialization in research across technology ﬁelds. For instance, table
3A shows that in the computer and communication category, small innovators transfer
23.9% of their patents while large innovators only sell 7.9% of theirs. But in the chemical
category the sale rates are 17.2% and 12.5% for small and large innovators respectively.
4.2 Patent characteristics and the transfer and renewal of patents
The second set of patterns we present identiﬁes a set of patent characteristics that are
systematically related to the trading and the renewal decision; namely the total number of
patent citations received by a given age, the patent generality, whether the patent has been
previously traded and the timing of the last trade. These patterns can help us understand
what type of patents are more likely to be sold and how quickly the change in ownership
occurs over the life cycle of a patent.34 In addition, the following patterns are consistent
34I will be generally omitting the standard errors of the proportions in the Tables below because they
are small as the number of observations is rather large. We will report them whenever we think they are
useful such as in the discussion of pattern #10. The reader can ﬁnd the estimates of all regressions and
17Table 3: Proportion of Patents Traded and Expired by Patent Category and Patentee
Computer Drugs & Elec. &
Chemical & Comm Medical Electro. Mechanical Other
A. Proportion of patents traded over their life cycle by patent categories
Individual owned patents 16.1 15.8 17.0 14.7 11.6 10.1
Unassigned 16.1 15.6 16.8 14.4 11.3 9.9
Priv. Inventor 15.7 19.1 20.1 19.5 16.1 13.7
Corporations (Innovators) 15.0 13.0 16.0 14.0 12.3 14.9
Small 17.2 23.9 20.1 18.2 15.7 16.2
Medium 15.8 16.9 14.2 15.4 12.0 14.1
Large 12.5 7.9 13.3 11.2 8.5 12.3
Govt. Agencies 4.0 2.6 4.4 4.6 4.7 3.2
All 14.9 12.9 16.0 13.8 12.0 13.1
B. Proportion of patents expired up to the last renewal fee by patent categories
Individual owned patents 77.5 73.0 69.3 68.4 74.1 81.1
Unassigned 72.8 69.8 69.0 74.6 79.3 81.3
Priv. Inventor 75.6 62.3 60.1 66.3 77.0 77.1
Corporations (Innovators) 58.3 44.6 54.5 51.9 56.7 60.1
Small 59.0 54.2 53.2 58.7 62.4 63.9
Medium 58.5 46.6 54.1 52.5 57.2 57.3
Large 57.6 40.6 59.1 48.1 49.0 53.6
Govt. Agencies 80.7 91.6 65.1 84.3 86.5 86.8
All 60.0 47.3 57.4 55.1 61.7 67.9
Note: the proportions of this table are created using a pooling of all U.S. patents granted from 1983 to 2001 and their
trading and renewal decisions.
18with the predictions of the model as presented in Section 2.35
Pattern #5: Active patents with a higher number of total citations received by a given
renewal date are less likely to be allowed to expire.
Table 8B, in the appendix, presents the estimates of the decision of whether to allow a
patent to expire at a renewal date regressed on the total number of citations received by the
renewal date and a number of patent characteristics. The ﬁrst column of this table presents
estimates for the whole sample, while the rest of the columns contain the estimates that
were obtained from running separate regressions for each patentee. The rows of the table
present estimates on citations for diﬀerent sets of patent characteristics which include age
dummies, patent category dummies and patentee dummies. The estimates of the number of
total citations received by a given age are negative and statistically signiﬁcant. A negative
number indicates that patents with a higher number of citations are less likely to be allowed
to expire. For instance, using the estimates that control on age and technology ﬁeld of
the sample of small innovators and evaluating the predicted probabilities at the mean of
the sample, an extra citation decreases the predicted probability of an active patent being
allowed to expire at age 13 by about 1 percentage point, i.e., decresing from 36.9% to 35.9%.
Since the distribution of total citations is highly skewed, it is also useful to calculate this
predicted probability at a higher percentile of total citations. The predicted probability
decreases to 27.1% when evaluated at the 95 percentile of total citations.
Pattern #6: Active patents with a higher number of total citations received by a given
age are more likely to be traded.
Table 8A, in the appendix, shows the estimates of regressing the decision to trade an
active patent on a number of controls. The structure of this table is similar to table 8B.
The sign of the estimates of citations is positive, implying that patents with more citations
received by a given age are more likely to be traded.36 The estimates are signiﬁcant at
their corresponding standard errors in the appendix.
35Since we there is no systematic data on licensing, we are consequently neglecting the possiblity that
some patents that are not traded could be licensed. To the extent that licensed patents are were likely to
be cited than the not traded and the not licensed ones, it is likely that an average patent in our sample
of not traded patents will have more citations received than a patent never traded and never licensed.
Consequently, neglecting licensing would make the eﬀect of citations received in the trading decision vs
not trading decision, which is what we currently do, to be less strong than the eﬀect of citations received
in the trading decision vs a not trading and not licensing decision.
36Similar results are obtained when using the total number of citations received by the maximum legal
length of patent protection.
19standard levels and they are robust to a number of speciﬁcations.37 Using the estimates
that control on age and technolog ﬁeld for the sample of small innovators, as presented
in Table 8A, and evaluating the predicted probabilities at the mean of the sample of age,
technology ﬁeld and total citations, we can calculate that an extra citation increases the
predicted probability of an active patent being traded at age 7 by about 0.02 percentage
points, i.e., increasing the rate from 1.92% to 1.94%. This predicted probability increases
to 2.13% when it is evaluated at the 95 percentile of total citations.
Pattern #7: A c t i v ep a t e n t sw i t hh i g h e rg e n e r a l i t ym e a s u r e sa r em o r el i k e l yt ob et r a d e d
and less likely to expire.
Table 10A and 10B, in the appendix, present respectively the estimates of both the
regression of the probability of a patent being traded and the probability of a patent being
alllowed to expire regressed on the generality measure and a number of controls. The
ﬁr s tc o l u m no ft h et a b l ep r e s e n t st h ee s t i m a t e so ft h ew h o l ed a t as e tw h i l et h er e s to ft h e
columns show the estimates of separate regressions for each type of patentee. The rows
consider diﬀerent sets of patent characteristics. The estimates of generality are positive in
the trading decision and negative in the expiring one. They are are statistically signiﬁcant
for every set of patent controls, i.e., age dummies, adding technology ﬁelds, adding citations,
and the last one adding patentees.38 When running a separate regression for each patentee,
the result are consistent except for government agency patents. A positive coeﬃcient in the
trading decision implies that higher patent generality is associated with a higher probability
of a patent being traded; a negative estimate in the expiring decision implies that patents
with higher generality have a lower likelihood of being allowed to expire. For instance, using
the estimates for small innovators that control on age and patent category, as presented
in Table 10, the predicted probability of a patent being traded at age 9 evaluated at the
sample mean of generality, patent age and category is 2.00%. This probability increases
to 2.26% when evaluated at the 95 percentile of generality holding the values of the rest of
the variables ﬁxed. Similarly, the predicted probability of an active patent expiring at age
37There is one exception, the regression for the sample of patents of large innovators. The negative
coeﬃcient of patent citations is based on patent that belong to patent category 4 (Electrical and electron-
ics). In the rest of the categories, the coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant or not statistically signiﬁcant.
Moreover, when we estimate the probability of a granted patent being traded using the same explanatory
variables, the eﬀect of citations is signiﬁcant across patentees and robust to patent categories.
38It is worthy to point out that when adding citations to the previous controls, the coeﬃcient estimate of
generality in the expiring decision drops by about three times, but the one in the trading decision does not
change much. This result is consistent with generality capturing market oportunities to transfer a patent
independently of how valuable the patent is, which is consistent with our deﬁnition of the improvement
factor ge.
20Table 4: Patents Traded and Expired for Small Innovators
A. Patents Traded as a Percentage of All Active Patents
Previously Traded (Years since last trade)
Age of Patent (Years) All Not Previously Traded Any Year 1 2 3 4
1 2.505 - - - - - -
2 2.335 2.225 5.287 5.287 - - -
3 2.201 2.068 4.753 5.265 4.244 - -
4 2.179 2.007 4.453 5.043 4.291 4.025 -
5 2.220 1.989 4.407 5.324 4.527 3.840 3.769
6 2.017 1.753 4.068 4.935 4.127 3.765 4.103
7 1.902 1.621 3.805 4.963 3.750 3.796 3.567
8 1.885 1.565 3.801 4.962 3.860 4.075 3.595
9 1.937 1.566 3.789 4.825 3.162 3.915 3.878
10 1.779 1.404 3.494 3.839 3.369 4.825 3.221
11 1.676 1.354 3.042 3.937 3.618 3.671 2.836
12 1.540 1.264 2.626 3.276 3.851 2.537 2.411
13 1.675 1.331 2.868 2.001 2.273 4.721 3.280
14 1.680 1.330 2.847 3.234 2.774 4.513 4.070
15 1.362 1.008 2.497 2.802 2.189 2.698 3.0
16 1.157 0.861 2.075 2.229 1.559 3.817 1.439
17 0.841 0.607 1.566 1.818 1.181 2.821 1.976
B. Patents Expired as a Percentage of All Active Patents
Previously Traded (Years since last trade)
Age of Patent (Years) All Not Previously Traded Any Year 1 2 3 4
5 18.399 18.958 12.707 6.696 12.148 14.456 16.08
9 29.143 30.077 24.087 11.253 18.650 22.070 23.407
13 33.014 34.131 28.830 15.515 22.663 24.280 29.614
Note: the proportion of this table are created using a pooling of all U.S. patents granted from 1983 to 2001 and their trading and renewal decisions.
9 decreases from 27.8% to 26.0% when evaluated at the sample mean of generality and the
95 percentile respectively.
Pattern #8: Active previously traded patents of the same age, and in particular the re-
cently traded, are more likely to be traded and less likely to be allowed to expire than
patents not previously traded.
Table 4 shows the proportion of small innovators active patents traded and let to expire
conditional on both being previously traded or not and the timing of the last trade. Figure 2
shows the proportion of an active small innovator patent being traded conditional on having
been previously traded or not. It useful to examine the robustnes of these proportions
in more detail and to assess the results across patentees and technology ﬁelds. Table 9,
in the appendix, presents the estimates of both the probability of a patent being traded
and the probability of a patent being allowed to expire regressed on whether a patent has
21Figure 2: The Number of Patents Traded as a Proportion of Active Patents Conditional
on Having Been Previously Traded or Not (Small Innovators)















been previously traded and a number of controls. Table 11, in the appendix, shows the
estimates of the same probabilities but now regressed on the number of years since the last
trade and patent controls. The structure of these tables is similar to the previous ones.
The estimates indicate that previously traded patents, and especially the recently traded,
are more likely to be traded again and less likely to be allowed to expire. For instance,
using estimates that control on age and patent category for the sample of small innovators,
as presented in Table 9, and evaluating the predicted probabilities at the mean patent age
and categories, we can calculate that the predicted probability at age 7 of a patent being
traded increases from 1.68% to 3.81% if it has been previously traded. The probability of a
patent being expired at age 9 decreases from 29.5% to 23.0% for previously traded patents.
The results are signiﬁcant at standard signiﬁcance levels and robust to technology ﬁeld and
patentee dummies. When we run separate regressions for each patentee, the results are
also statistically signiﬁcant. There are few exceptions like patents of government agencies.
Pattern #9: The number of expired patents as a proportion of all active patents (i.e., the
expiration rate) increases with the renewal dates.
Table 4B shows that the expiration rate is increasing with the renewal dates for small
innovator patents. The pattern is similar across type of patentees and it is signiﬁcant
and robust to technology ﬁeld dummies as seen in the logit regressions. Table 6, in the
appendix, presents the estimates.
22Figure 3: The Number of Patents Traded as a Proportion of Active Patents (Small Inno-
vators and Individual Owned Patents)















Pattern #10: The number of patents traded as a proportion of all active patents decreases
with age except in the year immediately after a renewal date. The year immediately
after a renewal date, this rate discontinuously increases.
Figure 3 shows the probability of an active patent being traded as a function of its
age for both small innovator patents and individually owned patents. The decreasing
pattern is consistent across type of patentees and patent categories with the exception of
large innovators. Table 12, 13, 14 and 15, in the appendix, show the estimates of the
age dummies in regressions run with a number of controls. Using the estimates from
the logit regressions with age dummies, we ﬁnd that the jumps in the transfer rate are
signiﬁcant at standard signiﬁcant levels for the sample of all patents and for individually
owned patents (private inventors and unassigned patents), but for small innovators the
jumps are signiﬁcant but at somewhat higher signiﬁcance levels.39 T h er e s u l t sa r es i m i l a r
when technology ﬁeld controls are used.40
39We test the following three null hypothesis for all the samples: i) age_year4≥age_year5; ii)
age_year8≥age_year9; and iii) age_year12≥age_year13. If the p values are suﬃciently low then, we
can reject the hypothesis and conclude that the jumps are signiﬁcant at a certain statistical signiﬁcance
level. We obtain the following p values. The ﬁrst to last number in the parenthesis represent null hypoth-
esis i to iii. All innovators (0.2819; 0.00; 0.00); Individually owned patents (0.00; 0.00; 0.00), unassigned
(0.00; 0.00; 0.00), private inventors (0.0529; 0.0755; 0.03776), small innovators (0.140; 0.1468; 0.0308);
medium innovators (0.9697; 0.0125; 0.00); large innovators (0.00; 0.00; 0.6461) and government agencies
(0.777; 0.00; 0.4490). Similar results are obtained when the sample proportions are used instead of the age
dummies.
40When we estimate the probability of a patent being traded on age dummies and total citations received
by a given age, the jumps of the age dummies after a renewal date are smaller than when the variable total
23In addition, we have four remarks concerning the above patterns. First, renewal dates
do not act as a signalling device in a context of asymmetry of information with respect to
the value of patent protection. When we use the sample of patents that never expired,
and look at the probability of a patent being traded, this probability does not discretely
jumps the year after a renewal date. Second, when we condition on granted patents, the
probability of a patent being traded decreases with age with no jumps in the year after
a renewal date. Third, there are elements other than age and total citations received by
ag i v e na g et h a ta ﬀect the trading decision. We ﬁnd that despite controlling for total
citations received by a given age and generality, previously traded patents are still more
likely to be traded than the ones that were not previously traded. Fourth, total citations
received are not a perfect measure of the value of patent protection. For instance, patents
keep getting citations after their expiration date. Two reasons might be that citations are
not contemporaneous with patent protection and that citations also represent spillovers.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has used a newly constructed data set showing the transfer of ownership of
patents to study how signiﬁcant the initial missallocation of patent property rights is and
to provide a summary of basic patterns of the transfer and renewal of patents.
We have explored a number of issues in this paper. The ﬁr s ta s p e c tw eh a v el o o k e da t
is whether the missallocation of patent property rights and the intensity of patent trading
diﬀers by the type of patentees and technology ﬁelds. We have found that small innovators
and private inventors are the most active sellers of patents, while government agencies and
large innovators are the least. The number of patents traded as a proportion of all granted
patents is a signiﬁcant number, and it is higher when weighted by the importance of the
patents as measured by their total number of citations received. Furthermore, there are
diﬀerences in the rates of transfer and renewal across patent categories, having computer
and communications, drugs and medical, and electricity and electronics as the most actively
traded.
The second aspect we have analyzed are the patent characteristics and the life cycle
properties of the transfer and renewal of patents. We have found a number of patterns.
First, among patents of the same age, we showed that those with a higher number of total
citations received by a given age are more likely to be traded and less likely to be allowed
citations received by a given age is not included. To the extent that the number of total citations received
by a given year is correlated with the revenue of a patent, the result is consistent with the implications of
the theoretical model considered in the paper.
24to expire. Second, among patents of the same age, those with higher generality are more
likely to be traded and less likely to expire. Third, among traded patents of the same
age and especially the recently traded, they are more likely to be retraded and less likely
to be allowed to expire than the previously untraded ones. Fourth, the probability of an
active patent being traded decreases with age, but with one exception - the year following
immediately after a renewal date this probability discontinuously increases. Finally, the
probability of an active patent being allowed to expire increases with age.
These empirical results have implications concerning the way markets for technology are
structured and operate. First, the signiﬁcant proportion of patents sold and the timing
of the sale suggests that the patent system permits the transfer of intellectual property
assets towards a more proﬁtable use. The transfer of patents might happen because of a
comparative advantage by potential buyers due to a better use of the existing technology,
complementary assets, or perhaps an improvement of the existing technology that in order
to be legally implemented requires the acquisition of prior intellectual property rights. The
former issue is particularly relevant for economic policy because the eﬃciency of the patent
system has been especially criticized in the context in which innovations are sequential and
the discovery and adoption of technological improvements might be blocked by incumbents.
Second, the fact that a signiﬁcant proportion of patents is transferred also suggests that
residual control rights are important in the functioning of the market for patents. One
implication of this is that innovators prefer to acquire patents rather than license them to
minimize potential hold up problems. Third, the fact that small innovators are more likely
to sell their patents than their larger counterparts indicates that small innovators might be
specializing in research which is then sold in the form of patents to others, maybe to large
ﬁrms with a comparative advantage in the production or commercialization process. In
this context, understanding the degree of specialization and the size of the gains from trade
i nt h em a r k e tm a t t e r sb e c a u s eo fi n n o v a t i o n ,m e r g e r sa n dt h ed e s i g no fp a t e n tp o l i c y . F o r
instance, the beneﬁts of the market for patents could oﬀset concerns about the ineﬃciencies
associated with the patent system such as the granting of monopoly rights. Finally,
the model of patent transfer we have used to understand the dynamics of patent trading
suggests that the interplay betweeen costs of technology adoption, the gains from trade
and the value and age of patents are important determinants of the transfer of technology.
Furthermore, the new data will allow scholars to empirically address questions that
previously were not attainable. For instance, Serrano [50], estimates the gains from trade
in the market for patents. Other interesting empirical questions in which the data can be
useful might be: Do small ﬁrms specialize in the creation of knowledge and then sell their
patents to their larger counterparts? To estimate the returns to R&D through the market
25for patents? To what extent did the move towards higher protection of intellectual property
rights that occurred in the 1980s facilitate specialization and the transfer of knowledge in
the form of patents? Do patent property rights tend to be transferred at the local level
like spillovers do? Researchers can also examine policies to promote innovation in the
context of markets for technology such as the use of taxation on the transfer of intellectual
property. We leave these topics for future research.
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Appendix
In this section, we discuss the methodology used to create a panel of patents that details
their histories of trades and renewal decisions. First, we explain the raw data that we obtained
from the USPTO. Second, we present the methodology to identify subsequent assignments, or
"reassignments", (i.e., other assignments than the ones from an individual inventor to, generally,
the ﬁrm that he/she works at). Third, we discuss two caveats of the data. Finally, we describe
the sampling of cohorts and the construction of the panel of patents used to derive the main
patterns of the transfer of patents.
The Raw Data and the Methodology to Identify Reassignments
The Raw Data
The information obtained from the patent oﬃce contains all patent assignments recorded in
the USPTO from August 1980 until December of 2001. An assignment as deﬁn e db yt h eU S
Patent Law is a writing document that acknowledges the transfer by a party of all or part of its
30right, title and interest in a patent or patent application. The data, in principle, includes all
patents assigned from inventor to ﬁrms, from ﬁrms to inventors, from inventor to inventor, and
from ﬁrm to ﬁrm. The total number of patents assigned is very large. There are 2,753,320
records.
Each assignment contains substantial information. In particular, it contains (i) a unique
identiﬁer ("Reel Frame"), (ii) the date the assignment was recorded at the USPTO ("Recorded
Date"), (iii) the date the private transaction was executed ("Date Signed"), and information on
the patents or patent applications that contain such as ("Patent Number", "Application Number",
"Issue Date", "Application Date" and "Patent Title"), (iv) the buyer ("Assignee"), (v) the seller
("assignor"). Finally, (vi) a brief comment that summarizes the rational behind the transaction
("Brief").41
We separate assignments concerning administrative events using the information contained
in the "Brief" ﬁeld of a patent assignment from the raw data. They are "Assignment of As-
signors" (77.66%), "Merger" (3.01%), "Security Interest" (10.08%), "Change of Name" (5.18%),
"Nunc Pro Tunc" (0.13%), etc. Later, we will restrict our work to "Assignment of Assignors"
and "Merger" (i.e., type 1 and 2). Assignments with brief "Assignment of Assignors" contain
both ﬁrst assignments (i.e., from an inventor to the ﬁrm he/she works for) and reassignments
(i.e., transactions that potentially represent the transfer of the ownership of a patent across ﬁrm
boundaries). The rest of the type of assignments (i.e., types 2 to 9) only take place after a ﬁrst
assignment has taken place.
There are few preliminary procedures we follow before identifying reassignments. First, we
focus on utility patents. Second, we delete patents assigned more than once within the same
assignment. Third, we delete patents eventually withdrawn by the USPTO. Fourth, we consider
patents that were granted before January 1, 1975 because are the ones in which both the name
of inventors and assignees are available. Finally, we trim commas, dots, slashes, etc. and rename
few names of assignees, buyers and sellers.
Identifying reassignments
The main objective is to diﬀerentiate ﬁrst assignments from reassignments. We use of patent
characteristics such as the patent’s grant date, patent’s application date, inventor’s name and the
name of the owner of the patent by the time the patent is granted (i.e., the "assignee" as of the
grant date of the patent).
There are several key reasons that makes identifying reassignments diﬃcult. First, an as-
signment might occur at the application date or at any date thereafter. Consequently, the ﬁrst
41The information concerning the patents issue date is sometimes missing. We use patent
characteristics information related to issue date, application number and date from other sources
such as the NBER patent database or the USPTO patent grant data.
31assignment of patents granted or applied before August 1980 is not necessarily contained in the
raw data on assignments we obtained.42 Second, we also found (but very rarely) that inventors
(only when there is more than one inventor in the patent application) of the same patent might
assign it to the same ﬁrm using separate assignments. Third, sometimes the same patent is
assigned more than once stating same buyer and seller but having diﬀerent execute and recorded
date (this can be as a result of corrections to previous assignments, etc). These caveats of the
raw data require some explicit methodology.
The methodology we use has two general principles. First, we conjecture that patents that
appear to be the ﬁrst time recorded as an assignment in the raw data are the patents more likely
to be considered as "ﬁrst assignment". However, not all ﬁrst recordations are ﬁrst assignments,
patents applied before 1980 might appear to be assigned for ﬁrst time in the raw data but maybe
they were already (ﬁrst) assigned at their application date. Second, we consider that transactions
including only one patent with brief of type 1 are more likely to be a ﬁrst assignment than others.
In general, assignments ﬁrst time recorded that include a single patent should be treated diﬀerently
in the cleaning process.
First assignments with one patent and brief containing the words "Assignment of as-
signor"
The number of ﬁrst assignments with one patent is 1,521,869. The method to identify
redundant assignments consists in grouping assignments according to their characteristics, and
then categorize them in ’types of matches’. There are some general rules that we consider
when we deﬁne what a redundant and a non-redundant assignment is. In particular, redundant
assignments are those that would be consistent with ﬁrst assignments (i.e., an inventor appears
as the seller and the buyer is the owner of the patent as of the grant date). Another one is that
assignments (other than individual assigned patents) in which the inventor appears as the seller
will be considered redundant.
(i) Match 1 assignments are those in which the name of the seller coincides with the inventor
and the name of buyer coincides with the name of the assignee as of the granted patent date.43
Match 1 represents 83.77% of all assignmetns.
(ii) For the rest of assignments, a match 2 assignment is one where the assignee’s name
coincides with the buyer’s name. For instance, this could account for cases in which other
inventor than the ﬁrst one assigns the patent to the assignee (by the grant date). Match 2
42In principle all patents with an application date posterior to August 1980 that have been
assigned should be included in the raw data. Of course, this does not apply to unassigned patents.
Moreover, we have found some (but few) missing assignments for some patents, especially in the
last months of the year 1980.
43First, we eliminate all commas, dots, spaces between of the stream of characters. Then we
compare the ﬁrst four characters. We consider that two streams of characters coincide if the ﬁrst
four characters are exactly the same.
32represents 3.19% of all assignmetns.
(iii) For the rest of assignments, a match 3 consists of those assignments where the inventor
coincides with the seller, and the type of assignment type is: "not assigned" (i.e., 1), assigned
to an "U.S. individual" (i.e., 4), or assigned to a foreign individual (i.e., 5). Match 3 represents
3.01% of all assignmetns.
(iv) For the rest of the assignments, match 4 are those that the seller coincides with the
inventor and the assignee type (as of the grant date) is a "U.S. ﬁrm" (i.e., 2), a "foreign ﬁrm"
(i.e., 3), a "U.S. federal government agency" (i.e., 6) or a "foreign government" (i.e., 7). For
instance, in some of these assignments an inventor migh be assigning the patent to the ﬁrm he/she
work but the name of the assignee might be slightly diﬀerent from the buyer’s name (e.g. buyer
as Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba (or other names) and the assignee is Toshiba Corporation). Match
4 represents 8.15% of all assignmetns.
(v) Finally, match 5 is left for the rest of assigned patents. Match 5 represents 1.88% of all
assignmetns.
The redundant assignments are the following. First, assignments that are match 1, 2 and
4. Second, assignments that date recorded coincides with the applications date. The rest of
the assignments are not redundant. It is not surprising that a larger number of all assignments
considering only one patent are redundants (i.e., 95.4%) because ﬁrst assignments contain only
one patent. This is because in the U.S. patent system inventors act as applicants rather than
ﬁrms. We have 70,296 non-redundant patent assignments. The conditions for single patent
assignments are more restrictive than with the rest of assignments because in principle they are
more likely to be redundant.
The rest of assignments
There are 607,057 in this sample. The same rules are applied to clean the rest of assign-
ments with only one exception, assignments under match 4, as deﬁned above, are not considered
redundant. This is based on the fact that inventors assign their patents to the ﬁrms they work
in a one by one basis rather than in bundles. As a result, assignments in this sample are indeed
less likely to represent ﬁrst assignments (i.e., from inventor to assignee) than the ones in the
previous sample. After the cleaning process, we ﬁnd that 6.97% of the patent assignments in this
sample are redundant, which implies that in this sample there are 564,745 non-redundant patent
assignments.
Finally, considering ﬁrst assignments of one patent and the rest of assignments, we have
635,041 non-redundant patent assignments.
Other cleaning issues
We examine four more issues. First, we do not consider transactions in which the buyer and
seller are the same entity. In practice, we delete assignments when the ﬁrst characters of the
33buyer and seller ﬁeld coincide only when the patent was originally assigned to corporations or
government agencies. The remaining number of patent assignments is 506,510.
Second, we exclude patent assignments in which the word "bank" was contained in either
buyer or seller, but only when the word "bank" was initially contained in the name of the assigne
of the patent as of its grant date. The reason for this is that we want to minimize the eﬀect
of potential labeling mistakes of the USPTO between "Security Interest" and "Assignment of
Assignors". The patent assignments left are 490,960.
Third, we exclude patent assignments where the execution date is before the application date.
These patents might be as a result of a private contracts either between inventors and ﬁrms, or
between two ﬁrms before the application date of the patent. The remaining number of patent
assignments is 464,343.
Fourth, we exclude patent assignments executed when patents were already expired. Some-
times and especially in large bundles of patent assigned, expired patent numbers are included in
the records. This leaves us with 453,477 patent assignments.44
Finally, out of 453,477 patent assignments, 418,846 are due to "Assignment of Assignors", and
34,631 due to "Merger".
General caveats of the reassignments data
A ﬁr s tc a v e a ti st h a tt h eU S P T Od o e sn o td i s t i n g u ish whether patents are traded as a result
of an acquisition of a ﬁrm or when patents individually acquired. If patents are recorded due
to the acquisition of a ﬁrm, especially a large ﬁrm, then the rational of the transaction can be
other than the quality of the patent portfolio of the acquired ﬁrm. For instance, the motivation
may be expanding market power, etc. To assess the importance of trades associated with ﬁrm
acquisition, we analyze the time series of patent transfers. In particular, we study the merger
waves of mid 1980’s and late 1990’s. We consider that during acquisition waves ﬁrms are less
likely to be acquired because of the value of their patent portfolio. According to Mitchell and
Mulherin [39], a substantial number of acquisitions in the wave of mid 1980’s could be explained
by major shocks such as deregulation, increased foreign competition, ﬁnancial innovations, etc.
Next, we study how the average number of patents contained in a transaction varies at every year
in the period 1983-2000. This rate more than doubles only at years in the mid 1980’s and late
1990’s. In addition, we also ﬁnd that the proportion of patents traded in bundles of more than
100 patents disproportionately increases in the same periods, but the number of patents included
in transfers of smaller sizes, such as less than 30 patents, does not increase at the same pace.
Therefore, we conclude that patents owned by large innovators are more likely to be recorded for
44We conjecture that technologies/innovations are associated pool of patens, thus when a tech-
nology is acquired, all patent number associated to that innovation are recorded in a single
assignment at the UPSTO. The cost of an assignment are independent of the number of patents
included. So, there are little incentives of not recording those patents.
34other reasons than their intrinsic technological value than those of small innovators and individual
inventors.
A second caveat is that the recordation of transfers of patents at the USPTO is not mandatory.
We argue that this is a very minor issue. Firms and individuals who buy patents have strong
ﬁnancial incentives to record them at the USPTO because only recorded transfers at the USPTO
act as evidence in courts of a bona ﬁde purchase. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence from interviews
with patent lawyers strongly support the eﬀective recordation of patents traded.
Other details about the data set and patterns
The data set we have constructed is a panel containing 1,933,470 patents with 198,310 patent
assignments, where a patent might have multiple assignments during its life cycle. In particular,
there are 170,470 patents traded. Table 5 presents the number of patents granted and the number
of patents sold by diﬀerent types of patentees.
The statistics and patterns reported in the paper using the data set have been constructed
by weighting each patent cohort by its number of patents granted or in some cases the number of
patents that were not previously expired (i.e., still active). There are positive eﬀects of weighting
cohorts and using a large number of patents. In particular, time series eﬀects such as merger
waves and economic business cycles are smoothed out through this aggregation.
35Table 5: Summary Statistics of the Number of Patents Traded and Not Traded over their
Life Cycle
Individually Owned Corporations Gov. Agencies
Unassigned Priv. Inventors Small Medium Large
Total 304,087 17,654 453,683 567,081 565,582 25,383
Traded 28,044 2,185 54,533 53,359 31,540 809
Not traded 276,043 15,469 399,150 513,722 534,042 24,574
Table 6: Predicted probability of Patents Traded and Expired by Type of Patentees
Individual owners Corporations (Innovators) Govt. Agen.
Unassigned Priv. Inv. Small Medium Large
A. Predicted probability of patents traded over their life cycle
14.1 18.6 18.3 14.1 8.8 4.1
B. Predicted probability of patents expired up to the last renewal fee
85.0 78.4 61.7 54.0 48.7 89.1
Table 7: Predicted probability of Patents Traded and Expired by Patent Category
Computer Drugs & Elec. &
Chemical & Comm Medical Electro. Mechanical Other
A. Predicted probability of a patent being traded over the life cycle
14.4 13.6 13.2 13.4 11.3 11.8
B. Predicted probability of patents expired up to the last renewal fee
61.3 51.7 58.6 56.5 60.2 63.8
36Table 8: Estimates of the Logit Regressions of the Decision to Trade or Allow a Patent to
Expire Conditional on the Number of Patent Citations Received
All Individually Owned Corporations (Innovators) Govt. agen.
All Unassigned Priv. inv. All Small Medium Large
A. Trading Decision
With age dummies
total_citations 0.00689 0.0192 0.0192 0.0185 0.00498 0.0132 0.00562 -0.00614 0.00306
(0.000295) (0.000672) (0.0007) (0.00245) (0.000309) (0.000445) (0.0005521) (0.000934) (0.0063)
With age and patent category dummies
total_citations 0.00703 0.0163 0.0162 0.0174 0.00537 0.0109 0.00491 -0.00250 0.00432
(0.000297) (0.000683) (0.000710) (0.00254) (0.000311) (0.000463) (0.000527) (0.000910) (0.00603)
With age, patent category and patentee dummies
total_citations 0.00744 --- --- - -
(0.00029) --- --- - -
Obs 12876456 1969075 1856048 113027 10732311 3064018 3948742 3719551 175070
B. Expiration Decision
With age dummies
total_citations -0.0579 -0.0450 -0.0448 -0.0445 -0.0557 -0.0478 -0.0594 -0.0527 -0.0518
(0.000346) (0.000820) (0.000848) (0.00318) (0.000385) (0.000677) (0.000663) (0.0006531) (0.00265)
With age and patent category dummies
total_citations -0.0532 -0.0406 -0.0406 -0.0394 -0.0522 -0.0834 -0.0572 -0.0480 -0.0529
(0.000350) (0.000835) (0.000864) (0.00324) (0.000388) (0.00866) (0.000667) (0.000654) (0.00271)
With age, patent category and patentee dummies
total_citations -0.0499 --- --- - -
(0.000349) --- --- - -
Obs 2321364 373918 352559 21359 1911564 559918 712799 638847 35882
*Not statiscally signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **Not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, ***Not statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
37Table 9: Estimates of the Logit Regressions of the Decision to Trade and Expire a Patent
for Previously Traded Patents
All Individual Owners Corporations (Innovators) Govt. agen.
All Unassigned Priv. inv. All Small Medium Large
A. Trading Decision
Controls: age dummies
Previouslytraded 1.0401 1.1221 1.1376 0.8926 1.0085 0.8591 0.8904 1.1814 0.9091
(0.00691) (0.0156) (0.0162) (0.0570) (0.00774) (0.0116) (0.0130) (0.0177) (0.1530)
Controls: age and patent category dummies
Previouslytraded 1.0317 1.0926 1.1052 0.8894 0.9976 0.8425 0.8793 1.1451 0.8631
(0.00692) (0.0156) (0.0163) (0.0570) (0.00775) (0.0116) (0.0130) (0.0178) (0.1533)
Controls: age, patent category dummies and citations
Previouslytraded 1.0277 1.0716 1.0844 0.8684 0.9952 0.8307 0.8776 1.1447 0.8588
(0.00692) (0.0157) (0.0163) (0.0572) (0.00776) (0.0117) (0.013) (0.0178) (0.1537)
Controls: age, patent category, patentee dummies and citations
Previouslytraded 0.9428 - - - - - - - -
(0.00697) - - - - - - - -
Obs 10942986 1647334 1551961 95373 9145965 2610335 3381661 3153969 149687
B. Expiration Decision
Controls: age dummies
Previouslytraded -0.3011 -0.8969 -0.8993 -0.8264 -0.1552 -0.3440 -0.1136 -0.1379 -1.0576
(0.00573) (0.0128) (0.0132) (0.0490) (0.00647) (0.0101) (0.0103) (0.0148) (0.0746)
Controls: age and patent category dummies
Previouslytraded -0.3155 -0.8723 -0.8730 -0.8355 -0.1663 -0.3341 -0.1060 -0.1762 -1.0472
(0.00576) (0.0128) (0.0133) (0.0492) (0.00649) (0.0102) (0.0104) (0.0148) (0.0751)
Controls: age, patent category dummies and citations
Previouslytraded -0.2904 0.8270 -0.8280 -0.7882 -0.1482 -0.2906 -0.0910 -0.1913 -0.9873
(0.0058) (0.0129) (0.0134) (0.0495) (0.00654) (0.0102) (0.0104) (0.0150) (0.0759)
Controls: age, patent category, patentee dummies and citations
Previouslytraded -0.3554 - - - - - - - -
(0.00589) - - - - - - - -
Obs 2321364 373918 352559 21359 1911564 559918 712799 638847 35882
*Not statiscally signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **Not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, ***Not statistically signiﬁcant at
the 10% level.
38Table 10: Estimates of the Logit Regressions of the Decision to Allow a Patent to Expire
or Being Traded Conditional on Patent Generality
All Individually owned Corporations (Innovators) Govt. agen.
All Unassigned Priv. inv. All Small Medium Large
A. Trading Decision
With age dummies
generality 0.1902 0.2144 0.2127 0.2132 0.1978 0.2011 0.1833 0.2099 -0.0860***
(0.00697) (0.0160) (0.0166) (0.0591) (0.00777) (0.0121) (0.0126) (0.0169) (0.1020)
With age and patent category dummies
generality 0.2119 0.2109 0.2092 0.2051 0.2146 0.1975 0.1749 0.2125 -0.0928***
(0.00699) (0.0162) (0.0168) (0.0602) (0.00779) (0.0122) (0.0127) (0.0169) (0.1020)
With age, patent category dummies and citations
generality 0.2073 0.2034 0.2015 0.1997 0.2109 0.1903 0.1710 0.2151 -0.0978***
(0.00702) (0.0163) (0.0169) (0.0606) (0.00781) (0.0123) (0.0127) (0.0169) (0.1025)
With age, patent category, patentee dummies and citations
generality 0.1977 --- -----
(0.00703) --- -----
Obs 12876456 1969075 1856048 113027 10732311 3064018 3948742 3719551 175070
Used 11395526 1717383 1617743 99640 9527208 2707508 3485280 3334430 150170
B. Expiration Decision
With age dummies
generality -0.1862 -0.0982 -0.0965 -0.1056* -0.1765 -0.1418 -0.2099 -0.1828 -0.1145
(0.00508) (0.0106) (0.0109) (0.0459) (0.00596) (0.0101) (0.00978) (0.0114) (0.0350)
With age and patent category dummies
generality -0.1681 -0.0958 -0.0940 -0.1110 -0.1666 -0.1407 -0.2012 -0.1670 -0.1224
(0.00510) (0.0108) (0.0111) (0.0465) (0.00597) (0.0101) (0.00980) (0.0114) (0.0352)
With age, patent category dummies and citations
generality -0.0502 -0.0386 -0.0386 -0.0369 -0.0492 -0.0435 -0.0538 -0.0455 -0.0511
(0.000359) (0.000856) (0.000887) (0.0033) (0.000399) (0.000707) (0.000687) (0.000671) (0.0281)
With age, patent category, patentee dummies and citations
generality -0.0818 --- -----
(0.00513) --- -----
Obs 2321364 373918 352559 21359 1911564 559918 712799 638847 35882
Used 2084493 331408 312327 19081 1721853 501791 637128 582934 31232
*Not statiscally signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **Not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, ***Not statistically signiﬁcant at the
10% level.
39Table 11: Estimates of the Logit Regressions of the Decision to Trade and let a Patent
Expire Conditioning on the Number of Years Since the Last Transfer
All Individual Owners Corporations (Innovators) Govt. agen.
All Unassigned Priv. inv. All Small Medium Large
A. Trading decision
With age dummies
tradedyearsago -0.1236 -0.1932 -0.2013 -0.0819*** -0.1092 -0.0968 -0.1642 -0.0274*** 0.5787*
(0.00815) (0.0177) (0.0183) (0.0714) (0.00919) (0.0136) (0.0150) (0.0232) (0.2831)
tradedyearsago^2 0.00548 0.00938 0.00999 0.000386*** 0.00466 0.00457 0.0102 -0.00825 -0.0729*
(0.000725) (0.00156) (0.00160) (0.00681) (0.000819) (0.00123) (0.00128) (0.00227) (0.0294)
With age and patent category dummies
tradedyearsago1 -0.1235 -0.1929 -0.2014 0.0788*** -0.1091 -0.0964 -0.1639 -0.028*** 0.5869*
(0.00815) (0.0177) (0.0183) (0.0715) (0.00919) (0.0136) (0.0150) (0.0232) (0.2830)
tradedyearsago^2 0.00547 0.00939 0.0100 0.000421*** 0.00463 0.00461 0.0101 -0.00795 -0.0728*
(0.000725) (0.00156) (0.00160) (0.00681) (0.000819) (0.00123) (0.00128) (0.00226) (0.0293)
With age, patent category dummies and citations
tradedyearsago1 -0.1234 -0.1934 -0.2018 -0.0798*** -0.1089 -0.0962 -0.1635 -0.028*** 0.5849*
(0.00815) (0.0177) (0.0183) (0.0715) (0.00919) (0.0136) (0.015) (0.0232) (0.2839)
tradedyearsago^2 0.0055 0.00949 0.0101 0.000652*** 0.00466 0.00461 0.0101 -0.00789 -0.0729*
(0.000725) (0.00156) (0.0016) (0.00682) (0.000819) (0.00123) (0.00128) (0.00226) (0.0293)
With age, patent category, patentee dummies and citations
tradedyearsago1 -0.1291 - - - - - - - -
(0.00815) - - - - - - - -
tradedyearsago^2 0.00582 - - - - - - - -
(0.000724) - - - - - - - -
Obs 10942986 1647334 1551961 95373 9145965 2610335 3381661 3153969 149687
Used 833270 156274 144592 11682 672783 271308 260889 140586 4213
B. Expiration decision
With age dummies
tradedyearsago 0.3699 0.4013 0.4099 0.2959 0.3589 0.3166 0.3565 0.4271 0.4828
(0.0080) (0.0188) (0.0196) (0.0693) (0.00890) (0.0138) (0.0143) (0.0202) (0.1123)
tradedyearsago^2 -0.0225 -0.0230 -0.0236 -0.0149 -0.0222 -0.0201 -0.0210 -0.0278 -0.0364
(0.000643) (0.00148) (0.00154) (0.00534) (0.000720) (0.00113) (0.00114) (0.00164) (0.00939)
With age and patent category dummies
tradedyearsago 0.370 0.4047 0.4141 0.2999 0.3594 0.3192 0.3565 0.4298 0.4984
(0.00802) (0.0189) (0.0196) (0.0694) (0.00892) (0.0139) (0.0143) (0.0202) (0.1130)
tradedyearsago^2 -0.0226 -0.0231 -0.0237 -0.0151 -0.0223 -0.0204 -0.0210 -0.0279 -0.0374*
(0.000645) (0.00148) (0.00155) (0.00535) (0.000721) (0.00113) (0.00114) (0.00165) (0.00945)
With age, patent category dummies and citations
tradedyearsago 0.3691 0.4080 0.4172 0.3087 0.3574 0.3193 0.3498 0.4309 0.5085
(0.00807) (0.0190) (0.0197) (0.0701) (0.00897) (0.0139) (0.0144) (0.0204) (0.1143)
tradedyearsago^2 -0.0226 -0.0232 -0.0239 -0.0154 -0.0223 -0.0204 -0.0207 -0.0285 -0.0362
(0.00065) (0.00149) (0.00156) (0.0054) (0.000727) (0.00114) (0.00115) (0.00167) (0.00959)
With age, patent category, patentee dummies and citations
tradedyearsago 0.3641 - - - - - - - -
(0.00807) - - - - - - - -
tradedyearsago^2 -0.0225 - - - - - - - -
(0.00065) - - - - - - - -
Obs 2321364 373918 352559 21359 1911564 559918 712799 638847 35882
Used 212705 39844 36906 2938 171754 69986 66495 35273 1107
*Not statiscally signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **Not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, ***Not statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level,
and ****The valididty of the model ﬁt is questinable.
40Table 12: Estimates of the Logit Regressions of the Decision to Sell and Expire a Patent
Conditional on its Age by Type of Patentees (With Age Dummies)
All Individually Owned Corporations (Innovators) Govt. agen****
All Unassigned Priv. inv.**** All Small Medium Large
A. Trading decision with age dummies
intercept -4.8354 -4.7893 -4.7185 - -4.8341) -4.7686 -4.6403 -5.170 -
(0.0448) (0.1392) (0.1393) - (0.0473 (0.0894) (0.0692) (0.0943) -
age_year1 0.8306 1.2407 1.1498 - 0.7586 1.1072 ) 0.6722 -0.3664 -
(0.0451) (0.1396) (0.1397) - (0.0477) (0.00899 (0.0692) (0.0955) -
age_year2 0.7499 0.8487 0.7586 - 0.7281 1.0352 0.6248 0.4421 -
(0.0451) (0.1399) (0.1400) - (0.0478) (0.090) (0.070) (0.0955) -
age_year3 0.6861 0.6726 0.5869 - 0.6915 0.9748 0.5513 0.5043 -
(0.0452) (0.1400) (0.1402) - (0.0478) (0.0901) (0.0710) (0.0956) -
age_year4 0.6807 0.6586 0.5685 - 0.6869 0.9644 0.5173 0.5443 -
(0.0453) (0.1401) (0.1403) - (0.0479) (0.0902) (0.0702) (0.0957) -
age_year5 0.7119 0.8275 0.7376 - 0.6934 0.9835 0.4826 0.6330 -
(0.0454) (0.1405) (0.1406) - (0.0481) (0.0904) (0.0706) (0.0957) -
age_year6 0.5990 0.6301 0.5455 - 0.5937 0.8854 0.3877 0.5172 -
(0.0456) (0.1409) (0.1411) - (0.0482) (0.0906) (0.0708) (0.0963) -
age_year7 0.5559 0.5490 0.4615 - 0.5613 0.8259 0.3311 0.5593 -
(0.0457) (0.1412) (0.1414) - (0.0484) (0.0908) (0.0711) (0.0964) -
age_year8 0.5446 0.5972 0.5132 - 0.5412 0.8163 0.2659 0.5834 -
(0.0458) (0.1413) (0.1415) - (0.0485) (0.0910) (0.0711) (0.0966) -
age_year9 0.6311 0.7974 0.7124 - 0.6039 0.8441 0.3283 0.7258 -
(0.0462) (0.1425) (0.1428) - (0.0490) (0.0918) (0.0724) (0.0972) -
age_year10 0.5971 0.6849 0.5949 - 0.5837 0.7573 0.4074 0.6565 -
(0.0465) (0.1432) (0.1436) - (0.0492) (0.0923) (0.0725) (0.0979) -
age_year11 0.5500 0.6849 0.5515 - 0.5331 0.6968 0.3173 0.6565 -
(0.0468) (0.1432) (0.1445) - (0.0496) (0.0929) (0.0733) (0.0979) -
age_year12 0.4789 0.5853 0.5190 - 0.4607 0.6097 0.2553 0.6008 -
(0.0473) (0.1451) (0.1455) - (0.0501) (0.0938) (0.0743) (0.0993) -
age_year13 0.5954 0.8155) 0.7331 - 0.5627 0.6960 0.4627 0.5816 -
(0.0487) (0.1488 (0.1496) - (0.0517) (0.0965) (0.0763) (0.1028) -
age_year14 0.5378 0.6785 0.6197 - 0.5172 0.6994 0.2806 ) 0.6638 -
(0.0500) (0.1529) (0.1537) - (0.0530) (0.0982) (0.0796 (0.1042) -
age_year15 0.3606 0.5766 0.4955 - 0.3270 ) 0.4864 0.1981* 0.3550 -
(0.0523) (0.1578) (0.1593) - (0.0556 (0.1027) (0.0830) (0.1104) -
age_year16 0.3114 0.2433 ) 0.1992*** - 0.3141 0.3213 0.1552** 0.5464 -
(0.0552) (0.1729 (0.1743) - (0.0584) (0.1098) (0.0878) (0.1125) -
Obs 12876456 1969075 1856048 113027 10732311 3064018 3948742 3719551 175070
B. Expiring decision with age dummies
intercept -0.6941 -0.2969 -0.2900 -0.4012 -0.7631 -0.7075 -0.7265 -0.8504 0.0895*
(0.00395) (0.0108) (0.0112) (0.0437) (0.00429) (0.00811) (0.00690) (0.00744) (0.0368)
age_year5 -0.8806 -0.3888 -0.3809 -0.5512 -1.1018 -0.7820 -1.1864 -1.4035 -1.2133
(0.00458) (0.0117) (0.0121) (0.0479) (0.00515) (0.00931) (0.00840) (0.00942) (0.0402)
age_year9 -0.2293 -0.0126 -0.0126 -0.0185*** -0.3133 -0.1809 -0.3417 -0.4122 0.1703
(0.0202) (0.0125) (0.0129) (0.0506) (0.00521) (0.00967) (0.00840) (0.00917) (0.0412)
Obs 2321364 373918 352559 21359 1911564 559918 712799 638847 35882
*Not statiscally signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **Not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *** Not statistically signiﬁcant at the
10% level, ****The valididty of the model ﬁt is questinable.
41Table 13: Estimates of the Logit Regressions of the Decision to Sell and Expire a Patent
Conditional on its Age by Type of Patentees (With Age and Patent Category Dummies)
All Individually Owned Corporations (Innovators) Govt. age.****
All Unassigned Priv. inv.**** All Small Medium Large
A. Trading decision with age and patent category dummies
intercept -4.7716 -4.9988 -4.9320 - -4.7036 -4.8248 -4.6152 -4.9348 -
(0.0450) (0.1395) (0.1395) - (0.0476) (0.0897) (0.0698) (0.0958) -
age_year1 0.8584 1.2533 1.635 - 0.7617 1.0819 0.6687 0.3968 -
(0.0451) (0.1397) (0.1397) - (0.0477) (0.0899) (0.0699) (0.0955) -
age_year2 0.7475 ) 0.8623 0.7733 - 0.7305 1.0121 0.6219 0.4689 -
(0.0452 (0.1399) (0.1400) - (0.0478) (0.0900) (0.0700) (0.0956) -
age_year3 0.6835 0.6869 0.6024 - 0.6932 0.9541 0.5490 0.5276 -
(0.0452) (0.1401) (0.1402) - (0.0479) (0.0901) (0.0701) (0.0956) -
age_year4 0.6780 0.6743 0.5853 - 0.6883 0.9461 0.5157 0.5640 -
(0.0453) (0.1401) (0.1403) - (0.0479) (0.0902) (0.0702) (0.0957) -
age_year5 0.7110 0.8324 0.7432 - 0.6964 0.9655 0.4808 0.6529 -
(0.0454) (0.1405) (0.1407) - (0.0481) (0.0904) (0.0706) (0.0959) -
age_year6 0.5986 ) 0.6365 0.5527 - 0.5967 0.8694 0.3866 0.5342 -
(0.0456 (0.1409) (0.1411) - (0.0482) (0.0906) (0.0709) (0.0963) -
age_year7 0.5554 0.5572 0.4704 - 0.5640 0.8118 0.3309 0.5726 -
(0.0457) (0.1412) (0.1414) - (0.0484) (0.0908) (0.0711) (0.0965) -
age_year8 0.5443 0.6073 0.5240 - 0.5437 0.8038 0.2667 0.5939 -
(0.0458) (0.1413) (0.1415) - (0.0485) (0.0910) (0.0715) (0.0966) -
age_year9 0.6326 0.7953 0.7104 - 0.6085 0.8299 0.3280 0.7427 -
(0.0462) (0.1425) (0.1428) - (0.0490) (0.0918) (0.0724) (0.0972) -
age_year10 0.5988 0.6839 0.5940 - 0.5882 0.7445 0.4077 0.6719 -
(0.0465) (0.1433) (0.1437) - (0.0492) (0.0923) (0.0725) (0.0979) -
age_year11 0.5517 0.6507 0.5530 - 0.5373 0.6851 0.3174 0.6833 -
(0.0468) (0.1440) (0.1445) - (0.0496) (0.0929) (0.0733) (0.0984) -
age_year12 0.4808 0.5872 0.5214 - 0.4646 0.5993 0.2551 0.6132 -
(0.0473) (0.1451) (0.1455) - (0.0502) (0.0939) (0.0743) (0.0993) -
age_year13 0.5983 0.8100 0.7280 - 0.5679 0.6845 0.4620 0.6003 -
(0.0487) (0.1489) (0.1497) - (0.0517) (0.0965) (0.0763) (0.1028) -
age_year14 0.5408 0.6749 0.6166 - 0.5220 0.6916 0.2805 0.6811 -
(0.0500) (0.1529) (0.1538) - (0.0530) (0.0982) (0.0796) (0.1042) -
age_year15 0.3629 0.5742 0.4934 - 0.3306 0.4812 0.1986* 0.3688 -
(0.0523) (0.1578) (0.1593) - (0.0556) (0.1027) (0.0830) (0.1104) -
age_year16 0.3123 0.2423*** 0.1982*** - 0.3156 0.3192 0.1556** 0.5532 -
(0.0552) (0.1730) (0.1743) - (0.0584) (0.1098) (0.0878) (0.1125) -
Obs 12876456 1969075 1856048 113027 10732311 3064018 3948742 3719551 175070
B. Expiring decision with age and patent category dummies
intercept -0.3483 -0.1314 -0.1270 -0.2172 -0.5601 -0.5771 -0.6523 -0.7339 0.2372
(0.00495) (0.0117) (0.0121) (0.0484) (0.00582) (0.00954) (0.00961) (0.0140) (0.0506)
age_year5 -0.8935 -0.4045 -0.3964 -0.5712 -1.1014 -0.7795 -1.1854 -1.4110 -1.2431
(0.00461) (0.0118) (0.0121) (0.0482) (0.00517) (0.00933) (0.00841) (0.00948) (0.0405)
age_year9 -0.2366 -0.0199*** -0.0198*** -0.0305*** -0.3157 -0.1802 -0.3428 -0.4216 0.1537
(0.00476) (0.0125) (0.0129) (0.0509) (0.00522) (0.00969) (0.00842) (0.00922) (0.0415)
Obs 2321364 373918 352559 21359 1911564 559918 712799 638847 35882
*Not statiscally signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **Not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *** Not statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%
level, ****The valididty of the model ﬁt is questinable.
42Table 14: Estimates of the Logit Regressions of the Decision to Sell and Expire a Patent
Conditional on its Age by Type of Patentees (With Age, Patent Category Dummies and
Citations)
All Individually Owned Corporations (Innovators) Govt. agen.
All Unassigned Priv. inv.**** All Small Medium Large
A. Trading decision with age,patent category dummies and citations
intercept -4.8493 -5.2216 -5.1547 - -4.7020 -4.9452 -4.6651 -4.9087 -6.4821
(0.0452) (0.1419) (0.1421) (0.0478) (0.0899) (0.070) (0.0963) (1.0095)
age_year1 0.9408 1.4837 1.3937 - 0.8238) 1.2103 0.7211 0.3698 1.1199***
(0.0453) (0.1422) (0.1424) (0.0479 (0.0901) (0.0701) (0.0960) (1.00620)
age_year2 0.8258 1.0857 0.9966 - 0.7893 1.1347 0.6713 0.4436 0.9398***
(0.0454) (0.1424) (0.1426) (0.0480) (0.0902) (0.0702) (0.0960) (1.0069)
age_year3 0.7561 0.9001 0.8155 - 0.7474 ) 1.0681 0.5945 0.5047 0.6874***
(0.0454) (0.1425) (0.1427) (0.0480 (0.0903) (0.0703) (0.0960) (1.0081)
age_year4 0.7444 0.8757 0.7867 - 0.7377 1.0504 0.5568 0.5436 0.9645***
(0.0454) (0.1425) (0.1428) (0.0481) (0.0903) (0.0704) (0.0960) (1.0067)
age_year5 0.7700 1.0185 0.9295 - 0.7400 1.0581 0.5168 0.6352 0.8431***
(0.0456) (0.1428) (0.1431) (0.0482) (0.0905) (0.0707) (0.0961) (1.0090)
age_year6 0.6512 0.8086 0.7253 - 0.6354 0.9515 0.4183 0.5188 1.2338***
(0.0457) (0.1432) (0.1435) (0.0483) (0.0907) (0.0709) (0.0965) (1.0068)
age_year7 0.6027 0.7172 0.6312 - 0.5985 0.8844 0.3590 0.5592) 0.6795***
(0.0458) (0.1434) (0.1437) (0.0484) (0.0909) (0.0712) (0.0966 (1.0108)
age_year8 0.5866 0.7552 0.6727 - 0.5744 0.8675 0.2917 0.5821 0.2795***
(0.0459) (0.1435) (0.1438) (0.0486) (0.0910) (0.0715) (0.0967) (1.0160)
age_year9 0.6661 0.9179 0.8340 - 0.6329 0.8786 0.3474 0.7335 1.2004***
(0.0463) (0.1446) (0.1450) (0.0490) (0.0918) (0.0724) (0.0973) (1.0157)
age_year10 0.6279 0.7943 0.7054 - 0.6094 0.7855 0.4244 0.6640 0.8873***
(0.0466) (0.1453) (0.1458) (0.0493) (0.0923) (0.0725) (0.0979) (1.0235)
age_year11 0.5770 0.7511 0.6547 - 0.5557 0.7184 0.3319 0.6766 1.1492***
(0.0469) (0.1460) (0.1466) (0.0497) (0.0929) (0.0733) (0.0984) (1.0207)
age_year12 0.5022 0.6759 0.6120 - 0.4803 0.6262 0.2671 0.6076 1.1230***
(0.0474) (0.1471) (0.1476) (0.0502) (0.0939) (0.0743) (0.0994) (1.0244)
age_year13 0.6086 0.8632 0.7843 - 0.5754 0.6914 0.4672 0.5978 1.1614***
(0.0488) (0.1508) (0.1517) (0.0517) (0.0965) (0.0763) (0.1028) (1.0550)
age_year14 0.5471 0.7140 0.6591 - 0.5264 0.6902 0.2834 0.6794 1.1184***
(0.0501) (0.1549) (0.1558) (0.0530) (0.0982) (0.0796) (0.1042) (1.0700)
age_year15 0.3671 0.6025 0.5250 - 0.3336 0.4789 0.1987* 0.3679 1.3161***
(0.0524) (0.1598) (0.1613) (0.0557) (0.1028) (0.0830) (0.1104) (1.0701)
age_year16 0.3160 0.2544*** 0.2131*** - 0.3185 0.3185 0.1568** 0.5525 1.4790***
(0.0553) (0.1750) (0.1765) (0.0584) (0.1098) (0.0879) (0.1125) (1.0813)
Obs 12876456 1969075 1856048 113027 10732311 3064018 3948742 3719551 175070
B. Expiring decision with age, patent category dummies and citations
intercept 0.00883*** 0.1336 0.1364 0.0629*** -0.2035 -0.2603 -0.2722 -0.3745 0.5870
(0.00545) (0.0129) (0.0133) (0.0533) (0.00636) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0148) (0.0540)
age_year5 -1.1390 -0.5939 -0.0406 -0.7755 -1.3425 -1.0015 -1.4353 -1.6417 -1.5186
(0.00488) (0.0124) (0.000864) (0.0510) (0.00546) (0.00993) (0.00862) (0.00941) (0.0433)
age_year9 -0.3490 -0.1113 -0.1103 -0.1316 -0.4247 -0.2821 -0.4576 -0.5228 0.0136
(0.00487) (0.0128) (0.0132) (0.0520) (0.00534) (0.00988) (0.00862) (0.00941) (0.0427)
Obs 2321364 373918 352559 21359 1911564 559918 712799 638847 35882
*Not statiscally signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **Not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *** Not statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level,
****The valididty of the model ﬁt is questinable. 43Table 15: Estimates of the Logit Regressions of the Decision to Sell and Expire Patent Con-
ditional on its Age by Type of Patentees (With Age, Patent Category, Patentee Dummies
and Citations)




































B. Expiring decision with age, patent category, patentee dummies and citations
intercept 0.6308
(0.0126)
age_year5 -1.2198
(0.00497)
age_year9 -0.3853
(0.00493)
Obs 2321364
44